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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INVERSE CONDEMNATION:
SUPREME COURT GIVES PROPERTY OWNERS NEW RIGHTS
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)*
I. FACTS
Anthony Palazzolo and associates originally formed Shore Gardens,
Inc. (SGI) in 1959, to acquire waterfront property in Westerly, Rhode
Island.' The town of Westerly was incorporated in 1669.2 In recent years,
Westerly had become a popular vacation and seaside destination, with
thousands of visitors coming regularly to enjoy its beaches and coast.3
SGI's property was located between Winnapaug Pond and a well-traveled
road.4 The road provided chief access to the popular Misquamicut State
Beach.5 Most of the property had always been salt marsh subject to tidal
flooding. 6 Thus, substantial fill was needed before significant structures
could be built. 7 Over the years, SGI's periodic applications to develop the
property were rejected by various government agencies due to environ-
mental concerns, but after 1966 no applications were made for over a
decade. 8
Two intervening events were critical to the case.9 The first occurred in
1971, when the State formed respondent Rhode Island Coastal Resources
Management Council (Council) to protect the State's coastal properties, and
the Council created regulations known as the Rhode Island Coastal
Resources Management Program (CRMP).0 The CRMP designated salt
marshes like those on SGI's property as protected "coastal wetlands" on
which development was very limited.ll The second occurred in 1978 when
* Winner of a North Dakota State Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Comment Award.
I. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613 (2001).
2. Id. at 612.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 613.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-
2047) (explaining that Petitioner would have to fill his land in the same manner that neighboring
landowners did).
8. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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SGI's corporate charter was revoked and title to the property passed to
Palazzolo as the sole shareholder.12 In 1983 Palazzolo applied to the Coun-
cil for permission to fill his entire marsh land area. The Council rejected
the proposal, stating it would conflict with the CRMP.13 In 1985 Palazzolo
filed a new application with the Council, seeking permission to fill eleven
of the property's eighteen wetland acres to build a private beach club. 14
The Council rejected this application as well, ruling that the proposal did
not satisfy the standards for obtaining a special exception to fill salt marsh,
whereby the proposed activity must serve a "compelling public purpose."15
Subsequently, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode
Island Superior Court, claiming that the State's wetland regulations had
taken his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 16 The suit asserted that the Council's action violated
the test from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,17 which states that a
regulation that deprives a landowner of "all economically beneficial use" of
property is a total taking, thus requiring compensation.18
The court ruled against Palazzolo, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that Palazzolo's takings claim was not ripel9 and that he
had no right to challenge regulations that existed before he became the sole
owner of the property in 1978.20 The court also held that Palazzolo could
not assert a takings claim based on denial of all economic use of his proper-
ty because $200,000 in development value remained on an upland portion
of the property. 2l The court further stated that Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,22 which would allow recovery for owners with
reasonable expectations of developing their property, would not enable
Palazzolo to recover because his notice of the regulation eliminated any
reasonable development expectations. 23
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
Palazzolo's takings claim was ripe and had standing, yet it did not amount
12. Id.
13. Id. at 614-15.
14. Id. at 615.
15. See Petitioner's Brief at 4, Palazzolo (No. 99-2047) (setting out the regulatory standards).
16. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613 (2001).
17. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
18. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012;. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615.
19. Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 712-15 (R.I. 2000).
20. Id. at 716.
21. Id. at 715.
22. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
23. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 717 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)).
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to a deprivation of all economic use of the property. 24 The Court reasoned
that a final regulatory decision had been made to ripen the claim and
passage of title should not excuse a wrongful taking, but there was still
some value on the property. 25 However, the Court remanded for further
consideration of the claim under the factors set forth in Penn Central.26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Federal and state governments, along with other sovereigns, have the
inherent power of eminent domain, which is the power to "take" private
property for public use.27 To "take" means to compel property owners to
transfer interests in real or personal property to these governmental
.entities.28 However, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause prohibits the
government from taking private property for public use without just
compensation.29 The Takings Clause is applicable to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 30
There is a difference between an inverse condemnation suit and a direct
condemnation proceeding. 31 Direct condemnation proceedings are those in
which a government asserts its authority to condemn property on the basis
of its power of eminent domain. 32 The government acknowledges that it is
taking private property in a direct condemnation proceeding and is willing
to pay fair market value to the property owner as just compensation. 33
Inverse condemnation, on the other hand, is a claim by a property owner for
the taking of private property for public use by the government without for-
mal condemnation proceedings and without just compensation. 34 There-
fore, inverse condemnation is a cause of action that property owners have
when they think that the government should be required to pay them for
taking their private property.
35
24. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001).
25. Id. at 618-31.
26. Id. at 632.
27. See generally United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980) (discussing the application of
the power of eminent domain).
28. Id. at 257.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. See generally Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (explaining the
background and application of the Takings Clause to the states).
31. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 255.
32. See id. at 255-58 (showing the distinction between types of condemnation).
33. Id. at 256.
34. See id. at 257 (stating that inverse condemnation is initiated by a property owner, not the
government).
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 287 (7th ed. 1999).
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The government's physical occupation of private land for its own use is
the clearest kind of taking that occurs.36 The Supreme Court's decisions
establish that even the smallest physical encroachment on property requires
compensation under the Takings Clause. 37 It becomes more difficult to
determine whether a taking has occurred, however, when the government
limits property use through oppressive regulation because this is not as
tangible or obvious as a physical invasion of property. 38
A. REGULATORY TAKINGS
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,39 the Court recognized that there
will be times when government action does not physically occupy private
property, but nonetheless limits the property's use so much that a taking
occurs. 40 Writing the opinion, Justice Holmes stated the famous maxim that
"if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 4 1 Since Penn-
sylvania Coal, the Court has given some broad guidance to assist in
determining whether a government regulation goes "too far" and is a
regulatory taking.
36. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (stating that physical
encroachment upon private property by the government is an obvious taking).
37. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982). After
purchasing a five-story apartment building in New York City, a landlord discovered that cable
television (CATV) companies had installed cables on the building, both for serving other build-
ings and for serving the landlord's tenants. Id. at 421-22. The companies relied on a New York
statute that provided that landlords must permit CATV companies to install its facilities upon their
property and may not demand payment from the company. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828 (McKinney
1972) (repealed 1996); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423. The landlord then sued for a taking and
the United States Supreme Court held that the New York statute worked a physical taking of the
landlord's property for which the landlord was entitled to just compensation. Id. at 441; see also
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). The Court held that the govern-
ment's imposition of a navigational servitude requiring public access to a pond was a taking where
the land owner had relied on government consent in connecting the pond to navigable water. Id.
at 180. The Court emphasized that a physical invasion is a government intrusion of an unusually
serious character. Id.
38. See Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978) (explaining that absent
physical intrusion upon private property the government often has the right to regulate in ways
that adversely effect economic values when the regulation is for the purpose of health, safety,
morals, or general welfare).
39. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
40. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (reasoning that limiting property through regulation
can sometimes be as devastating as physically occupying it).
41. Id. Justice Holmes conceded that the mere diminution of property value due to govern-
ment regulation does not necessarily constitute a taking. Id. at 413. He remarked that "[glovern-
ment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law." Id.
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1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In Lucas, a regulation was enacted that had the direct effect of barring
the property owner "from erecting any permanent habitable structures on
his" property. 42 The Court found this unconstitutional, and it held that a
regulation that "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land" will require compensation under the Takings Clause. 43 A lawsuit that
alleges this occurrence has thus been called a "Lucas claim."44
The Lucas Court determined that a state could avoid paying for a total
regulatory taking only if the landowner did not have the "proscribed use
interests" before the regulations were established.45 Thus, the government
could avoid paying compensation for regulations that are otherwise total
takings if those regulations are to prevent landowners from using the
property in ways that were never allowed under the state's property law,
such as nuisances. 46
2. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
In Penn Central, a property owner sued for a taking by New York City
because it refused to approve plans for construction of a fifty-story office
building over Grand Central Terminal, which had been designated a land-
mark.47 The Court ruled that when a regulation puts limits on land that fall
short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless
may have occurred, depending on a complex set of factors.48 These factors
include: (1) the character of the governmental action; (2) the economic
effect on the landowner; and (3) the extent to which the regulation interferes
with reasonable investment-backed expectations. 49 These factors are
referred to as the Penn Central analysis.50
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A) (Law. Co-op. Cum Supp. 2001); see also Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992). In 1986 Lucas paid $975,000 for
two residential lots in South Carolina, with the intention of building single-family homes. Id. at
1006-07. In 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the statute that barred Lucas from
developing his property because of concerns about harming ecological resources on the coast.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007-08.
43. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
44. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 649 (2001) (referring to Palazzolo's takings
claim as a Lucas claim).
45. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
46. Id. at 1029.
47. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115-19 (1978).
48. See id. at 124 (discussing the rationale and history behind all of the factors).
49. Id.
50. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001); see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
2002]
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Underlying these factors is the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is
to stop the government from making some individual people pay the price
for benefits that help the public as a whole.51 Before a court can decide
whether there was a regulatory taking, however, it must decide the two
threshold questions of whether the claim was ripe and whether the claim
had standing when the regulation predated acquisition of title.52
B. RIPENESS REQUIREMENT
The purpose of the ripeness requirement is to "prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves
in abstract disagreements." 53 Judgment would be premature when "the
courts would benefit from further factual development of the issues."54 By
contrast, when the issue "will not be clarified by further factual
development" 55 outside the courtroom, then the issue "is fit for judicial
resolution,"56 and adjudication is not premature.
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City, 57 the Court held that a takings claim challenging the
application of land-use regulations was not ripe unless "the government
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final deci-
sion regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue."58
The Court stated that a final decision by the appropriate state agency aided
the constitutional determination of whether a regulation has deprived a
landowner under a Lucas claim or Penn Central claim.59 A court must
know the amount of authorized development on the land in question before
51. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). One way to test a regulation is that
if it "requires a landowner to confer some benefit on the public," it is a taking; but if the
"regulation ... merely prohibits the landowner from using the land to injure others," it is not a
taking. GRAND S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 1061 (1996). However, Justice
Scalia said in Lucas that this test is merely "in the eye of the beholder" and does not provide a
principled distinction. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
52. MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986).
53. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
54. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998) (quoting Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978)).
55. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985).
56. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 743 (1997) (quoting Abbott Lab.,
387 U.S. at 153).
57. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
58. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186.
59. Id.; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (stating the
requirement of compensation for a total regulatory taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (explaining the key factors when determining partial takings).
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it can resolve the takings issue.60 "A court cannot determine whether a
regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes." 6'
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County62 reveals how a massive
development application may not ripen to a takings claim.63 The landowner
in that case sued after being denied a proposal to develop his 159-home
subdivision. 64 The Court stated that his claim was not ripe because the
denial of the huge development plan left "open the possibility that some
development would be permitted." 65
Williamson County's final decision requirement is in place to enable
land-use boards to exercise their discretion and ease the regulations they
control. 66 Landowners must allow regulatory agencies to exercise this dis-
cretion before their claim can be deemed ripe.67 Regulators may well de-
cide to grant a variance or waiver after considering the development plans
for the property.68 Nevertheless, government authorities may not burden
property by imposing repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in order to
avoid a final decision. 69 Once a claim is deemed ripe, the other threshold
consideration of standing must be investigated.70
C. STANDING WHEN REGULATION PREDATES ACQUISITION OF TITLE
In recent years, federal courts and state courts have been faced with the
issue of whether a property owner has standing to assert a takings claim
when the relevant property was regulated before the present owner acquired
60. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986) (stating
that a court cannot determine whether there was a taking until the government has reached a final
decision on permitted development).
61. Id. at 348 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
62. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
63. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 342.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 352; see also Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 182 (1985) (involving a 476-unit subdivision); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that the claim was not ripe because no plan to develop
was submitted).
66. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 186(1985).
67. Id.
68. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 (1997) (showing the
difficulty of demonstrating that "mere enactment" of regulations restricting land-use effects a
taking).
69. See Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999) (holding
that nineteen different site plans submitted during a five year period to the regulatory agency
established that the agency was unfairly avoiding a final decision by imposing repetitive land use
procedures).
70. See MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986) (explain-
ing the threshold requirements to be met before a takings claim can be discussed on the merits).
2002]
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the property. 71 The Supreme Court ruled in Nollan v. Califormia Coastal
Commission72 that purchasers with notice of regulations on the land might
still have a compensation right when a claim becomes ripe. 73 The regula-
tory agency in Nollan required certain developers to grant an easement to
the public before being allowed to develop their property. 74 The Nollans
sought development in the area subject to the regulation and sued, claiming
an unconstitutional taking. 75 The Court ruled in favor of the Nollans,
holding that the regulation was a taking because it did not "substantially
advance[ ] legitimate state interests" because the easement did not serve the
public's health, welfare, or morals. 76 Most notably, the Court stated that the
Nollans' rights did not change simply since they had notice of the
regulation on their property, and "the prior owners must be understood to
have transferred their full property rights in conveying the lot."77
Other state courts have followed the reasoning in Nollan.78 Massachu-
setts courts have stated that property owners have standing to challenge
regulations despite knowledge of the regulations before they acquired the
property because real estate would lose its "transferability" otherwise. 79
The rule is similar in Florida, Colorado, and New Jersey. 80
Federal courts have also followed this rationale. In Levald, Inc. v. City
of Palm Desert,81 the Ninth Circuit distinguished a facial challenge from an
applied challenge. 82 The Ninth Circuit stated that for a facial challenge,
there is only a single injury imposed on the owner at the time a regulation is
71. See Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(stating that the government has a defense to a takings claim when the express regulation at issue
was merely codifying an existing principle of common law nuisance); see also City of Virginia
Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414, 417 (Va. 1998) (reasoning that the key issue is whether the
property use was regulated before the present owner acquired the property).
72. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
73. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
74. Id. at 825-29.
75. Id. at 829.
76. Id. at 834.
77. Id. at 833 n.2.
78. See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-15 (Mass. 1994); see also Karam
v. State, 705 A.2d 1221, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (noting that the government
should compensate an owner for an unreasonable zoning law despite the owner's knowledge of it
prior to acquisition).
79. Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1314-1315; Barney & Casey Co. v. Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Mass.
1949).
80. Vatalaro v. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 601 So. 2d 1223, 1229 (Fla. 1992); Cottonwood
Farms v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 763 P.2d 551, 556 (Colo. 1988); Urban v. Planning Bd. of
Manasquan, 592 A.2d 240, 244-45 (N.J. 1991).
81. 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993).
82. Levald, Inc., 998 F.2d at 688.
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enacted; thus, any subsequent owner of that property has no claim. 83
However, the Ninth Circuit explained that a regulation's harm may continue
and thereby enable a subsequent owner to have standing on a takings claim
when the regulation is applied to the subsequent owner. 84 The Court of
Federal Claims also recognized that despite the existence of heavy
regulation, property owners should not automatically lose all of their rights
related to the regulated use.8 5
However, other courts have not followed this line of reasoning. Some
state courts have reasoned that a regulation constitutes a "background
principle" of state property law, and as such, subsequent owners have no
right to assert takings claims. 86 These courts focus on whether the use was
regulated before the present owner acquired the property. 87 These state
courts apply the general rule of direct condemnation cases, which states that
any award for a taking goes to the owner at the time of the taking, and the
right to compensation is not passed to a subsequent owner.88 An owner has
no takings claim whenever the enactment of the regulation is prior to the
owner's acquisition of the property. 89
The Eighth Circuit also reached this result when it concluded that
owners were barred from asserting takings claims when the owners know-
ingly purchased property that was subject to existing regulations. 90 The
Federal Circuit also held that a regulation predating acquisition of title
precluded a takings claim by a subsequent owner under the "reasonable
investment-backed expectations" formula from Penn Central.91 In Good v.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 476 (9th Cir.
1994), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th. Cir. 1997) (im-
plying that a subsequent owner could have standing to assert a takings claim despite regulations in
existence before acquisition).
85. Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 790, 797 (1998).
86. Wooten v. S.C. Coastal Council, 510 S.E.2d 716, 717-718 (S.C. 1999); Kim v. New
York City, 681 N.E.2d 312, 314-16 (N.Y. 1997); see also Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Gover-
nor of Maryland, 293 A.2d 241, 250 (Md. 1972) (stating that riparian owners being placed in the
same position as under the common law precludes those owners from having standing on takings
claims).
87. City of Virginia v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414, 417 (Va. 1998); Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 314-16; see
also Kellogg v. Schreiber (In re Kellogg), 197 F.3d 1116, 1121 (11th Cir. 1999) (regarding
owners creating their own hardship).
88. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939) (stating essentially that a taking
in any condemnation suit takes place at the moment of the taking, and not thereafter).
89. Hunziker v. Iowa, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Ia. 1994).
90. See Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1996)
(stating that the owner did not have the claimed property right in his title at all).
91. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (discussing key
factors that determine whether a taking has occurred under a regulation). But see Bd. of County
Supervisors v. United States, 48 F.3d 520, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining that free
transferability of property is important and should not be unduly stifled).
2002]
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United States,92 the Federal Circuit stated that any person who buys with
notice of a regulation cannot reasonably expect to use the property in a way
that is contrary to the regulation, and no compensation may be obtained.93
Therefore, before Palazzolo, there was a split in the lower courts on the
issue of whether property owners had standing on takings claims when they
had notice of regulations before acquiring title.94
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined in a
five-to-four decision. 95 Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring with the
Court regarding the ripeness issue but dissented overall, specifically on the
standing and notice issues.96 Justices O'Connor and Scalia filed concurring
opinions, with Justice O'Connor stating that postenactment transfer of title
was still a factor in the Penn Central analysis, 97 and Justice Scalia stating
that it was not a factor.98 Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion based
on the ripeness issue and waiver ruling, which Justices Souter and Breyer
joined.99 Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion, stating that
reasonable investment-backed expectations must be the focus of the Penn
Central analysis.OO
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court held that Palazzolo's takings claim was ripe and had stand-
ing, yet it did not amount to a deprivation of all economic use of the proper-
ty.101 The Court reasoned that a final regulatory decision was made to ripen
the claim, and passage of title should not excuse a wrongful taking, but
92. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
93. Good, 189 F.3d at 1361.
94. Eric Pianin, Landowners Given New Rights on Environmental Curbs, WASH. POST, June
29, 2001, at A18. The notion that property owners could not win regulatory takings claims if they
bought their land after regulations became effective had some precedence in lower courts at all
levels-federal, state, circuit, and district courts. Id.
95. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 610 (2001).
96. Id. Justice Stevens especially thought that a subsequent purchaser of property only
possessed the rights that the property already had, and could not maintain a takings claim unless
the taking occurred when the subsequent owner was in possession. Id at 637-45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
97. Id. at 632-36.
98. Id. at 634-37.
99. Id. at 645-54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 654-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 616.
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there was still some value on the property.102 However, the Court remand-
ed for further consideration of the claim under the factors set forth in Penn
Central.10 3
1. Ripeness of Palazzolo's Takings Claim
The main question with respect to ripeness of the claim was whether
Palazzolo obtained a final decision from the Council regarding the per-
mitted use of the land. 104 The Court found that Palazzolo received such a
final decision from the Council in this case. 105 Palazzolo applied to fill his
land twice. 106 In 1983 he proposed to fill the entire parcel, and in 1985 he
proposed to fill eleven of the eighteen wetland acres to build a beach
club. 0 7  The Court concluded that the Council's denials of these
applications erased any doubt as to the extent of permitted development. 108
The Court responded to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's rationale.109
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that doubt remained as to what
development would be allowed because Palazzolo only submitted large
proposals, and he should have had to propose smaller plans before it could
be said that the Council made a final decision."10 For example, perhaps the
Council would have allowed Palazzolo to fill approximately five acres as
opposed to the eleven acres he proposed in 1985.111
However, the Court stated that the wetland regulations at issue here
were unambiguous.1 12 Under CRMP, Winnapaug Pond was under a certain
102. Id. at 618-32 (observing that the extent of permitted development was known, thus
ripening the claim and notice of a prior regulation did not bar the claim either). The Court stated
that Palazzolo's Lucas claim failed because there was substantial value remaining on the property.
Id. Nevertheless, the Court enabled Palazzolo to argue his claim under the Penn Central analysis
on remand to the state court. Id.
103. Id. at 632; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(discussing the factors to weigh, such as reasonable investment-backed expectations and the
character of the government action).
104. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001).
105. See id. at 619 (disagreeing with the Rhode Island Supreme Court's ruling that there was
not a final decision).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 619-21 (discussing how no permission to fill was granted by the Council).
109. Id. at 618-19.
110. Id. at 619; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 342 (1986)
(claiming that a highly ambitious proposal may not ripen a takings claim).
111. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 619 (2001).
112. Id. The Court explained that the only way the Council would have been able to grant an
exception to the regulations was if the proposed use served a compelling purpose. Id. The agency
stated that Palazzolo's proposed use did not serve that high purpose, and thus Palazzolo would not
be granted an exception to the regulations no matter what size of development he proposed. Id. at
619-20.
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classification that prevented a landowner from filling or building on
wetlands adjacent to it, but the landowner could seek a unique exception
from the Council to perform a forbidden use.1 13 However, the Council was
only allowed to permit an exception when a "compelling public purpose"
was served.'" 4 The Court reasoned that the Council found that Palazzolo's
proposed use did not fit this standard because the use itself was prohibited,
so it would not matter whether Palazzolo proposed to fill a smaller
surface. 115
The Court noted that the final decision requirement was in place to
allow regulators the opportunity to "exercise discretion" and to decide and
explain the reach of regulations.116 Until a landowner allows these pro-
cesses to take place, the extent of the restriction on property is not known
and a regulatory taking is not established.117 Yet once it becomes clear that
the agency lacks the discretion to permit any development, a takings claim
is likely to have ripened because there is no need for further regulatory
consideration of the issue.1 1 8 Government authorities cannot avoid a final
decision by establishing inequitable land-use processes on property. 19
The Court claimed that Palazzolo was distinguishable from the other
cases Rhode Island relied on because in those cases there was actual doubt
as to whether a more humble proposal would have been allowed. 120 In
MacDonald, for instance, there was only an application for a 159-home
subdivision, where smaller development likely would have been permit-
ted. 121  Williamson County was similar, except the proposal was even
larger, consisting of a 476-unit subdivision.122 In Palazzolo, further permit
applications were not needed to prove that the Council would not allow any
filling of the wetlands because it clearly would not. 123
However, the Court stated that not all of Palazzolo's parcel contained
preserved wetlands.124 There was evidence that an upland portion would be
113. Id. at 619. (citing Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMP) §§ 200.2,
210.3(C)(4)(1971)).
114. Id. at 619 (citing CRMP § 130A(2)(1971)).
115. Id. at 619-20.
116. Id. at 620.
117. Id. at 621.
118. Id. at 620.
119. Id. at 621 (citing Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999)).
120. Id. at 620.
121. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986).
122. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton, 473 U.S. 172, 182 (1985).
123. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 621 (2001).
124. Id. Eighteen acres of the approximately twenty-acre property consisted of the preserved
wetlands where no development was permitted. Id.
[VOL. 78:177
CASE COMMENT
worth around $200,000 if developed.125 The Court established that this
portion was not regulated by the "compelling public purpose" standard, and
the Council stated that it would have allowed development on that upland
parcel. 126 The Court explained that ripeness jurisprudence imposed the
obligation on Palazzolo to attempt development on the upland parcel only if
the land's permitted use was unknown, and it was not.127 Also, there was
no ambiguity as to the value of the uplands because the $200,000 value was
uncontested and agreed upon by both parties.128 Therefore, there was
certainty in the record as to the extent of permitted development on
Palazzolo's land, on the wetlands and uplands. 129
The Court explained that Rhode Island argued that it had no reason to
not accept the $200,000 value for the upland parcel because only a Lucas
claim was raised in the pleadings by Palazzolo.130 Thus, the argument was
that Rhode Island simply had to show that there was some value remaining
on the property for Palazzolo's claim to fail.131 However, the Court said
that Rhode Island knew that Penn Central applied, and it was discussed
earlier in the litigation.132 Hence, the Court also concluded that a Penn
Central claim was properly presented from the beginning of litigation. 133
2. Standing When Regulation Predates Acquisition of Title
The second reason the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to address
Palazzolo's takings claim was that the disputed parcel was owned by the
corporation of which he was the sole shareholder when the regulations were
in force.134 When Palazzolo acquired title by operation of law, the wetlands
regulations were in place. 135 The Court disagreed with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's holding that postenactment acquisition of title barred the
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 630-31 (citing Petitioner's Brief at 21, Palazzolo (No. 99-2047)).
129. Id. at 623-24. The Court explained that the Council made it clear that no fill would be
allowed for the wetlands portion for any purpose, be it a beach club or houses or something else.
Id. at 621. No structures could be built without fill, and development could not proceed. Id.
130. Id. (paraphrasing Brief for Respondent at 29-30, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606 (2001) (No. 99-2047)); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
131. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 623 (explaining the view that the state had no reason to fight
the notion that more than a $200,000 residence could be developed on the uplands).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 626.
135. Id.
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Lucas and Penn Central claims. 136 The Court stated that these holdings
would "amount to a single, sweeping, rule" that a subsequent property
owner would be seen as having notice to the regulation and be barred
categorically from asserting a takings claim.137 "This ought not to be the
rule," the Court remarked, because "[f]uture generations, too, have a right
to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land."138
The Court explained that the right to improve property is subordinate to
the reasonable exercise of state power such as valid zoning regulations.139
However, when particular restrictions become so burdensome and un-
reasonable, the Takings Clause requires compensation.140 An unreasonable
restriction remains so, even with passage of time or title.141 The Court
stressed that if it accepted Rhode Island's view, the state would not have to
defend any action restricting land use, no matter how irrational, as long as
title transferred after the regulation. 4 2 "A State would be allowed, in
effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause," since any
postenactment transfer of title would bar a takings claim. 143
The Court pointed out that there are different considerations for cases
alleging a taking based on an oppressive regulation as opposed to a direct
condemnation. 144 The general rule in direct condemnation cases, that com-
pensation may only go to the owner at the time of the taking, 'did not apply
because a challenge to land-use regulation does not mature until ripeness
requirements have been met. 145 The Court stated that this could take a long
time, and it would be unfair to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the
postenactment transfer of title "where the steps necessary to make the claim
ripe were not taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous owner.'146
The Court then turned to Nollan and found that its holding and reason-
ing was the controlling precedent. 4 7 The Court also found that Lucas did
not limit Nollan by stating that any new regulation becomes a background
principle of property law that cannot be challenged by subsequent title-
136. Id. at 627; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
137. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-27 (2001).
138. Id. at 627.
139. Id. (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 628.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)).
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holders. 148 The Court stated "a regulation that otherwise would be
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background
principle of the State's law by mere virtue of the passage of title."149 The
background principles in Lucas did not consist of a regulation that applied
to some landowners and not others, but rather, the principles apply to all
landowners.150 The Court then declared that the state court should address
petitioner's claims under Penn Central, because mere acquisition of title
after the date of regulatory enactment does not bar that claim. 151
3. "Lucas claim "-Total Deprivation of Value Taking
The Court next turned to the issue of whether there was a total taking
under Lucas.152 It agreed with the Rhode Island Supreme Court and held
that there was not a total taking because substantial value remained on the
property. 153 The Court explained that Palazzolo accepted the Council's
position that the parcel retained $200,000 in development value under the
CRMP.154 Palazzolo still asserted that he suffered a total taking because the
Council only left him with a nominal value in the land.155 However, the
Court found that the $200,000 value was not a token interest because a
spacious residence could be built on a few acres, which clearly was not
economically useless under Lucas.156
The Court reasoned that Palazzolo was precluded from arguing for the
first time that the upland parcel was distinct from the wetlands portion, and
that he should be allowed to claim a deprivation limited to the wetlands
portion.157 The Court stated that the case was based on the premise that
Palazzolo's entire parcel was the basis for his cause of action, and thus, the
total deprivation argument failed.158 The Court concluded that despite the
148. Id.; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829; see generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992).
149. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-30.
150. Id. at 630 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30).
151. Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
152. ld. at 630-31.
153. Id. at 631-32. The Court found that the $200,000 undisputed value remaining on the
property did not constitute "total deprivation" as is required under Lucas. Id. To meet the Lucas
standard, it must be proven that the value remaining on the property is at or near zero. Id.
154. Id. at 630-31.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 631.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 631-32.
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failure of Palazzolo's Lucas claim the state court did not address the merits
of his claim under Penn Central, and so the case was remanded.159
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor addressed the second part of the Court's opinion, the
standing and notice aspects.160 She stated that the Court's holding did not
mean that the timing of the regulation's enactment relating to the
acquisition of title was "immaterial to the Penn Central analysis."' 6' She
stressed that the postenactment acquisition of title should be seen as one
factor among others, rather than exclusively significant or insignificant,
because a landowner's reasonable expectations are affected by regulations
in place at the time of title acquisition. 62 Justice O'Connor found that if
existing regulations were not a part of the analysis, then some property
owners could "reap windfalls" and fairness would be lost. 163 There are
several significant factors in determining whether there was a taking under
Penn Central, and the outcome depends mainly on the particular circum-
stances of each case.164 She stated that Penn Central does not give precise,
bright line rules, but rather it provides key guideposts that lead to the final
conclusion of whether just compensation is required. 165
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia stressed that he did not share Justice O'Connor's view of
the standing and notice aspects of the Court's opinion.166 He provided an
example of what Justice O'Connor feared would happen if postenactment
acquisition of title had no bearing on the constitutionality of a regulation.167
A smart or risky real estate developer would realize that a regulation on an
unknowing landowner's property was unconstitutional and buy the land at a
low price because of the restriction. 168 Then, the developer would get the
"unconstitutional restriction invalidated" and sell the property at the higher
159. Id; see generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
160. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. Id.; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
162. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633.
163. Id. at 635.
164. Id.; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
165. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
166. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 637.
168. Id.
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value or develop it to its full value. 169 Thus, the developer would obtain a
windfall, the naive original owner would not receive any benefit, and the
original owner was the one who should have received compensation from
the government for the partial taking. 170
However, Justice Scalia explained that such knowledge or risk by the
developer is rewarded in a similar fashion in the stock market regularly.'71
He remarked that it may be nice to compensate the original owner, but cer-
tainly the government should not benefit because it would be the only party
of the three (original owner, smart or risky developer, and government) that
acted "unlawfully-indeed, unconstitutionally."1 72 Allowing the govern-
ment to benefit from the situation would be similar to forcing an innocent
purchaser, who bought property at a low rate from a thief, to turn over the
profit to the thief.173 Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that postenact-
ment acquisition of title should have no role in whether the regulation is
constitutional, whether analyzed as a total taking or Penn Central taking. 174
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion on the ripeness issue but
dissented overall, specifically on the standing and notice issues. 175 He
remarked that the Court made a broad decision on the postenactment
acquisition of title issue and "oversimplified a complex calculus" by not
addressing the particular facts and claims in Palazzolo.176 He stressed that a
succeeding landowner should not be able to receive compensation for a
taking of the previous owner's interest.1 77 Seemingly concluding that the
rule for a direct taking applies to a regulatory taking, Justice Stevens
explained that a taking is an event which occurs at a specific point in time,
and only the owner of the property being infringed upon at that time is
entitled to compensation. 78
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 636.
172. Id. at 637.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Justice Scalia explained in his concurrence in Palazzolo that the timing of title acquisition should
not matter because no matter when title was acquired, if there was an unconstitutional taking at
some point, it cannot go uncompensated. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 644 (2001).
175. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 638.
178. Id. at 638-39.
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Justice Stevens stated that the difficulty of Palazzolo was determining
when the alleged taking occurred.179 He stated that "precise specification"
was key. 180 The adoption of the regulation was when the taking occurred,
according to Palazzolo's complaint, because that is when filling the land
was prohibited.' 81 Even if that was so, Palazzolo was the wrong party to
bring this claim, Justice Stevens stated, because the owner of the property at
the time of the taking suffered the injury, and that was not Palazzolo. 182
Justice Stevens declared that Palazzolo's standing should not depend
on whether he had notice of the regulation because that "is irrelevant."183 If
the prior owner's property decreased in value from the earlier regulations,
Palazzolo "acquired only the net value that remained after that diminish-
ment occurred."184 If the regulation was invalid, Palazzolo had no right to
recover because he had no standing to complain about the events that
happened before he was the owner; thus the only remedy for him was to
enjoin the enforcement of the regulation.185 Similar to a situation with a
trespasser on a new owner's land, the new owner could eject the trespasser
but could not recover damages for fruit taken from the garden before the
new owner acquired the property. 186
Justice Stevens also noted that the holding in Nollan was consistent
with his analysis because the "triggering event" in that case occurred when
the Nollans owned the property.187 Despite having notice of the possible
taking, the Nollans did not try to obtain compensation for a taking that was
inflicted on a previous owner.188 However, Palazzolo was trying to obtain
compensation for a possible taking of a right that he never had. 189
Justice Stevens warned that the majority's extension of the right to
compensation for people "other than the direct victim of an illegal taking"
179. Id. at 640-41. Justice Stevens also pointed out that this is a major area of dispute, with
the state bringing evidence revealing "that limitations on coastal development have always
precluded or limited schemes such as Palazzolo's." Id. at 641 (citing Respondent's Brief at 11-12,
41-46, Palazzolo (No. 99-2047)). Justice Stevens noted that, in his view, a new regulation that
diminishes property value does not constitute a takings issue if it is "generally applicable" and
"directed at preventing a substantial public harm," and he believed the Council's regulation met
those criteria. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)).
180. Id. at 639.
181. Id. at 640-41.
182. Id. at 641.
183. Id. at 642.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 643.
188. Id.; see generally Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
189. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 641-42 (2001).
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could have broad consequences.190 Justice Stevens concluded by saying
that state law should determine whether Palazzolo or the previous owner
had the right to fill the wetlands, and if so, when that right was acquired by
the state. 191 He declared that the judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court should be affirmed. 192
E. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT
Justice Ginsburg wrote that the nature, extent, and permitted develop-
ment under the regulation were still unknown, and Palazzolo's claim was
not ripe.193 A regulatory takings claim is not ripe until the agency admini-
stering the regulation has made a final determination on how it will apply
the regulation to a particular parcel of land.194 When a landowner seeks
development from a regulatory agency and is denied, there is still not a final
decision unless the agency reveals the specific force of the regulations on
the land. 195
Therefore, Justice Ginsburg stated that rejections of large proposals for
development "may not ripen a takings claim."196 She then turned to the
MacDonald case as an example and claimed that Palazzolo's proposals
were very similar because they were "grandiose."1 97 Palazzolo could have
proposed a smaller development plan that would have been accepted
because development on the uplands portion undisputedly would have been
allowed.198 Hence, Justice Ginsburg wrote, Palazzolo's claim did not
ripen. 199
Justice Ginsburg declared that the Court's decision was unfair and
inexact.200 First, she stated the decision was unfair because Palazzolo
initially had the choice whether he would sue under Lucas or under Penn
190. Id. at 645.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 654 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Breyer joined Justice
Ginsberg's dissent. Id. at 645.
194. Id. at 646 (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 191 (1985)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348-51
(1986)). Justice Ginsburg remarked that the 159-home subdivision in MacDonald was similar to
what Palazzolo wanted to develop. Id.
198. Id. at 649.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 652.
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Central, or both.201 Palazzolo chose to sue only under Lucas, claiming that
Rhode Island's regulations left no use or value on his property.2 02 There-
fore, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, Rhode Island only needed to prove that
some value remained on the property to defeat Palazzolo's claim, and it did
establish that around $200,000 remained in development value.203 Because
Palazzolo never sued under the Penn Central partial-taking claim, Rhode
Island did not have to defend against it.204 Before the Court, however,
Palazzolo argued the Penn Central issue for the first time, and the Court
should not have allowed him to do s0. 205 This enabled Palazzolo to use
Rhode Island's admission of the $200,000 value as "offensive support for
other claims he state[d] for the first time," which was unfair to Rhode
Island since it had relied on Palazzolo's prior claim. 206
Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Court's decision was inaccurate be-
cause it found that there was no ambiguity in the record as to the extent of
permitted development on the uplands.207 Yet, she stated that there was
ample testimony at trial that indicated ambiguity as to how much develop-
ment would be allowed.208 Rhode Island simply confirmed that "it 'would'
approve a 'single home' worth $200,000."209 This left open the possibility
that it would approve even more development.210 Justice Ginsburg ex-
plained that the Court should not now state that Rhode Island waived its
ability to contest the $200,000 figure because the reason Rhode Island
initially accepted the figure was because it was more than enough to defeat
Palazzolo's Lucas claim.211
She declared that "the State's failure to appreciate that Palazzolo had
moved the pea to a different shell hardly merits the Court's waiver
finding." 212 Justice Ginsburg explained that the Court's waiver ruling esta-
blishes a dangerous precedent; unprincipled litigants can change their legal
theory and the record in their petition for certiorari, and if their opponent
does not object, the Court will review the case on a completely different
201. Id. at 648; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1011 (1992); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 118 (1978).
202. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 648 (2001) (citing petitioner's Complaint
17).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 650; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
205. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 650; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
206. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 652.
207. Id. at 653-54.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 652 (citing Respondent's Brief at 19, Palazzolo (No. 99-2047)).
210. Id.
211. Id.; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
212. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 652.
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basis. 213 Therefore, she claimed that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision should be affirmed.214
F. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENT
Justice Breyer agreed completely with Justice Ginsburg's dissent and
added that simply because property changes hands does not automatically
bar a takings claim. 215 He remarked that a great deal depends on whether
the circumstances of a change of ownership affects whatever reasonable
investment-backed expectations were in place. 216 Typically, reasonable
expectations will decrease rapidly as property changes hands over time. 217
According to Justice Breyer, the Penn Central analysis handles these
factors appropriately and fairly. 218
IV. IMPACT
Palazzolo is expected to have broad ramifications for environmental
and other land-use regulations and thus for property owners. 219 Despite
giving property owners new rights, the long-term impact of the decision is
somewhat unclear because it was fractured, and both sides in the case
claimed victory. 220
A. STANDING WHEN REGULATION PREDATES ACQUISITION OF TITLE
The most significant part of the Court's decision was the notice aspect,
allowing even property owners who purchased land after regulations take
effect to file suit for compensation. 221 This "marks the most explicit state-
213. Id. at 653.
214. Id. at 654.
215. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 655.
217. Id.
218. Id. Justice Breyer mentioned that a number of amici admonished that allowing Lucas
claims to survive despite changes in ownership may entice some landowners to make up claims by
purposefully transferring land until only "a nonusable portion remains." Id. (citing Brief of Amici
Curiae David W. Bromley, at 7-8, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No.99-2047)).
Yet, he remarked, he did not think "a constitutional provision concerned with 'fairness and
justice' could reward any such strategic behavior." Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40
(1960))).
219. See Pianin, supra note 94, at A18.
220. Id. Rhode Island claimed that key environmental protections were preserved by the
ruling because the Court did not condone the filling of sensitive wetlands, while Palazzolo stated
landowners could now go to court without filing repeated land use applications. Id.
221. Warren Richey, Court Hands Victory to Property Owners, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, June 29, 2001, at 3.
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ment yet by the high court" on this issue.222 Lower federal and state courts
were split on the issue, but it was widely adopted in many courts that
property owners could not win regulatory takings claims if they acquired
their property after regulations became effective. 223
Property rights groups such as the Pacific Legal Foundation and the
American Farm Bureau Federation are thrilled and stated it was a "break-
through in their efforts to curtail government encroachment" on private
land. 224 Some environmental groups like "Save the Bay" are afraid that
Palazzolo could motivate developers to start a wave of litigation chal-
lenging environmental and zoning rules, seeking large amounts of com-
pensation.225 Some regulators also fear that there will be a "chill" on
environmental regulations throughout all levels of government. 226
The Pacific Legal Foundation also claimed that the notice ruling sends
a strong message to regulators throughout America that they must give an
owner a fair price for land when they put a freeze on its private use. 227 The
Foundation further added that "[ilf government cannot take property from
one person, it also cannot take it from the person who buys or inherits the
property." 228
Palazzolo should help people who want to sell their regulated property
for a fair price and those who already own regulated property they cannot
use.229 However, some people argue that allowing a person to sue who
knowingly buys property that has restricted uses is an "invitation to
unscrupulous litigants" and could result in an undesirable increase in
litigation for takings claims.230
One case has addressed the impact of the Court's decision. 231 In Abka
Limited Partnerships v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources,232 a
Wisconsin court stated that a dockominium owner would have a ripened
takings claim if the state ever tried to "interfere with the owner's
222. Id.
223. Pianin, supra note 94, at A18.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Lyle Denniston, Landowners Gain New Weapon Against Zoning, BOSTON GLOBE, June
29, 2001, at A14.
228. Id.
229. Id. Palazzolo gives such people the recourse of going to court on a takings claim when
their land's value plummets due to excessive regulation. Id.
230. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 653 (2001) (stating there could be
negative consequences to the Court's decision).
231. See generally Abka Ltd. Partnerships v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 635 N.W.2d 168
(Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
232. 635 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
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entitlement to the appurtenant pier and boat slip," because of the decision in
Mr. Palazzolo's case.233 The Wisconsin court cited the Supreme Court's
language regarding ripeness and notice of prior regulations and stated that
those words could have "potential implications." 234
The ripeness aspect of the decision means that many landowners who
previously may have been discouraged from even attempting legal chal-
lenges know that they do not have to apply for permits over and over again
before they can go to court. 235 Although the decision is thus likely to give
property owners more access to the courts through the ripeness decision, it
does not resolve the question of whether they can be compensated if their
land does not end up being worth their "investment-backed expectations" at
the time they bought it.236 These are the basic unanswered questions of the
case: what is Palazzolo entitled to under the Penn Central analysis, and
what is fair compensation, if any? 237 The Court remanded these questions
back to state court.238
B. NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota does not have "coastal wetlands" per se, but regulatory
takings issues pertain to North Dakota as much as any other state. North
Dakota has many farmers and ranchers, and they own or lease large
amounts of land, which is increasingly subject to "regulation from all levels
of government-such as the state wetlands regulation at issue in this
case." 239 Therefore, the Court's decision regarding compensation for regu-
latory takings affects property owners and government planners throughout
the state. 240
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court gave property owners a "new
weapon" 241 against property regulations by finding that Palazzolo's claim
was ripe and had standing, yet it also said that the claim did not amount to a
233. Abka, 635 N.W.2d at 181.
234. Id.
235. See Harold Johnson, Supreme Court Strikes a Blow for Property Rights, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, July 3, 2001, at A14.
236. Id.
237. Id.; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
238. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001).
239. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n at 1, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047).
240. Id.
241. Denniston, supra note 227, at A14.
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deprivation of all economic use of the property.242 The Court remanded for
further consideration of the claim under the factors set forth in Penn
Central.243
Brent L. Slipka
242. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
243. Id.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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